



The Norwegian Police Security Service's (PST's) annual threat assessment is an analysis of anticipated developments within PST's areas of responsibility. It focuses on matters that may affect the security of Norway and harm national interests. The threat assessment is based on several sources of information, including PST's operational activity, assessments by partner agencies, and input from other agencies with relevant expertise. Norwegian society is exposed to actual and potential threats that may compromise Norwegian security and harm Norwegian interests unless they are countered.

This report is an unclassified summary of PST's classified threat assessment for 2008.

THREAT ASSESSMENT 2008

Politically motivated violence – terrorism

Politically motivated violence perpetrated by parties inspired by extreme¹ Islamism will represent a significant challenge for Norway in the years ahead. Extreme Islamist terrorism has a cross-border dimension, and developments in Europe also affect the situation in this country. The potential threat to Norway must therefore be seen in a European context.

The emphasis of extreme Islamist activity in Norway relates to the provision of support abroad, but there are also indications of increased radicalization².

Providing support in Norway to terrorism is done primarily through funds transfers to individuals or groups in foreign countries who are suspected of being connected to extreme Islamist organisations. Different forms of supporting terrorist organisations abroad will continue to be the dominant element in activities in Norway.

Increased radicalization in Norway makes the national threat picture more unpredictable. The experience of other European countries shows that individuals who become radicalized may quickly develop the intent and capacity to become operational. Radicalization may, among other things, lead to individuals from extreme Islamist groups increasingly deriving motivation from Norwegian political issues. Increased radicalization can lead to an increase

¹ *Extreme* is used by PST to describe a person who supports, encourages and justifies the use of violence or who carries out acts of violence or sabotage as a political means. *Extreme* therefore denotes the method and means but not the attitude of an individual.

² *Radicalization* is used by PST to refer to the process by which a person increasingly accepts the use of violence as a means of achieving political ends. Radicalization may relate to any political direction and does not exclusively relate to Islamism.

in extreme Islamist groups reacting negatively to national events or controversial political matters in Norway.

An increasing number of radicalized individuals in Norway results in a greater probability that individuals who present a threat will travel to areas of conflict, spend time at training camps, participate in jihad – or as a worst case scenario, support or participate in terrorist acts in Norway. The presence of Norwegian troops in Afghanistan is currently a key reason why Norwegian interests are regarded as legitimate targets by extreme Islamists.

Radicalization and providing support to terrorism are not two mutually exclusive activities. Individuals who provide support to extreme Islamist organisations abroad, can in some instances also contribute to radicalization in Norway.

In addition to extreme Islamist groups, other terrorist organisations also have a presence in Norway. This relates to some nationalist terrorist organisations which first and foremost provide various types of support to their own activity within their home country. These organisations do not represent a direct threat to Norway, but the activities that provide support to terrorism can often be illegal. Several such organisations appear on the EU's list of terrorist organisations.

Politically motivated violence – national extremism

In terms of national extremism, PST focuses on individuals connected to right-wing extremist groups, left-wing extremist groups, and animal rights extremist groups. The number of individuals connected to such groups appears to be stable in comparison to the number in 2006. The number of registered violent incidents connected to individuals from extremist groups is small, and was lower in 2007 than in 2006. National extremist groups do not currently represent a threat to vital Norwegian interests.

The Internet is an important tool for right-wing extremist groups. The number of websites and blogs with right-wing extremist content has increased and the material is now more racist and threatening than it has been in the past. Some groups have also begun to put greater emphasis on concrete political objectives. Certain groups also represent a threat of violence, and this has been expressed through certain events that occurred in 2007.

PST does not rule out the possibility that certain right-wing extremist groups might inspire individuals who sympathise with their cause to carry out acts of violence.

Left-wing extremist groups in Norway represent first and foremost a public order problem related to violent demonstrations, and to possible confrontations with individuals from right-wing extremist groups. Some demonstrations during 2007 were carried out in solidarity with counterpart groups abroad. This illustrates an increase in the level of co-operation between autonomous groups in Europe. PST does not expect any material change in the situation related to autonomous groups in Norway in 2008.

The number of recorded acts of sabotage by animal rights activists increased in 2007. These acts have mainly targeted the fur farming industry, and the breeding of animals for use in experiments, but also shops that sell fur. The acts are carried out by Norwegian and foreign activists, and have entailed significant loss for some individuals and businesses. PST considers it likely that this activity will continue in 2008.

Threats to dignitaries

PST has a duty to prevent threats to, and attacks on, dignitaries. The term ‘dignitary’ is used to describe members of the Royal Family, Parliament, the Government and the Supreme Court as well as representatives from corresponding bodies in other countries. Other individuals may be included in PST’s preventative work after special consideration.

Individuals who make threats to dignitaries differ in terms of both their motivation and intentions. A substantial number of those who make threats have serious mental illness, usually in the form of psychiatric illness and/or serious personality disorder. In many cases it appears as if the act of making the threat in itself satisfies the perpetrator. The majority of threats to dignitaries are therefore not motivated by an actual intention to carry out a harmful act, but rather by a desire to express dissatisfaction, apply pressure, punish, frighten or to attract attention to oneself or to one’s cause.

The number of recorded threats to Norwegian dignitaries has increased over the past three years. This is thought to be connected to the vast amount of personality-related material about dignitaries covered by the media. The general threat picture regarding Norwegian dignitaries

is not expected to change significantly during 2008. At times, however, certain dignitaries will be subjected to a heightened level of threat. Dignitaries who are described as representatives of controversial cases are assessed as being especially susceptible to threats.

Illegal intelligence activity targeting Norway and Norwegian interests

Intelligence activity by foreign states targeting Norway and Norwegian interests is at a persistently high level. Several sectors of Norwegian society are attractive targets for intelligence activity. A significant part of the intelligence activity is aimed at the petroleum and gas industries. On the political front, the intelligence activity is particularly aimed at Norwegian management and control of resources and decision-making processes as well as Norwegian considerations, strategies and its position in negotiations. The technology sector represents attractive targets in terms of both civil and military technology, in addition to dual-use goods that are subject to export control. Militarily, Norway's membership of NATO, its participation in international operations, and the Armed Forces' national capacity and military doctrines are of interest to those collecting intelligence. In relation to the above, Norwegian private and public players abroad are also potential and real targets of illegal intelligence activity. Furthermore, the activities of several states are directed at groups of people in exile in Norway. The intelligence activity of foreign states can inflict substantial economic and political harm on Norwegian interests. The activity could also restrict the options for framing and implementing independent Norwegian policy, and may weaken Norway's bargaining position in relation to other states. The loss of business secrets, market share and contracts may also contribute to a reduction in income and jobs.

It is important to highlight that intelligence activity has both short-term and long-term perspectives. Ongoing intelligence activity does not necessarily have immediately visible consequences, but over time these can become very significant. Norway is an open society and much of the information is freely available. This provides conditions that lend themselves to the activity of foreign intelligence services. Counter intelligence activity is best accomplished in each business if people are conscious of the intelligence threat, the value of the information they manage, how and with whom the information is shared, and how the information is protected.

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The objective of non-proliferation work is to prevent know-how, raw materials or products from being exported from Norway to players that may have an intention to develop and

produce weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery. The term 'weapons of mass destruction' includes in this context the so-called CBRN materials: chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. In the non-proliferation area, PST has also focussed in 2007 on preventative activity directed at both industry and learning institutions in order to combat their wilful or inadvertent contribution to goods, technology or knowledge for use in the development of weapons of mass destruction. PST prioritises the pursuit and further development of its information work aimed at raising the consciousness of parties involved in export, as well as to further develop national mechanisms of export control.

Export control is largely connected to lists of goods the export of which require a license. This includes mainly military equipment or equipment that in the first instance has a civilian use, but that could also be used in a military situation. Furthermore, there is a general requirement to have a licence for the export of military goods to countries that are in conflict or that are affected by a UN-mandated boycott. For example, the UN Security Council Resolutions 1734 and 1747 provides stringent conditions for exports to Iran. PST has in the course of 2007 recorded an increase in the number of possible breaches of export control law. The recorded increase could partly be the result of increased national co-operation and improved control methods. Meanwhile, procurement activity targeting Norway and other western countries is at a high and ever more sophisticated level. Players who have a conscious desire to evade export control try to exploit loopholes and weaknesses in the established systems of control. There are also examples indicating that Norway is used as a means of evading other countries' export control regimes.

PST's assessment is that it is hardly likely that a non-state player can carry out a terrorist strike with CBRN-material in Norway resulting in mass murder. Several non-state players, however, show an interest in CBRN-materials. Despite a terrorist strike by non-state players being hardly likely, PST's assessment is that a terrorist strike carried out using such material would have a deep psychological effect on a civilian population – even though it is believed that such an attack in itself would cause less damage than an attack carried out with conventional weapons.

The threat to Norwegian interests abroad

PST's responsibility beyond Norway's borders is to provide advice and assistance in connection with threats to and the protection of Norwegian diplomatic missions and

Norwegian businesses that are of significance to vital national interests, as well as to provide advice and assistance in connection with dignitaries on foreign trips.

The threat to Norwegian interests abroad will vary depending on local conditions, and over time. However, incidents sometimes happen without warning and without them necessarily being directly targeted at Norway. In addition, incidents for which Norway attracts negative attention can result in violent reactions against Norwegian interests.

