



The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) prepares on an annual basis a threat assessment outlining anticipated developments within PST's areas of responsibility. The threat assessment, which is classified, is based on several sources of information including PST's operational activity, assessments by partner agencies and input from other institutions with relevant expertise. The focus of the threat assessment is Norway and Norwegian security interests and the timeframe is the year ahead. This document is an unclassified summary of PST's threat assessment for the year 2007.

UNCLASSIFIED THREAT ASSESSMENT 2007

There is currently no direct threat to the security of the realm. However, Norwegian society is exposed to several potential threats that, if not combated, could involve Norwegian security being compromised and national interests being damaged. This relates in particular to threats from individuals and groups motivated by extreme Islamist ideology. These elements represent a continuing threat to European security. A key challenge for PST in 2007 will therefore be the prevention of terrorist acts throughout the country, and supporting the counter terrorism efforts of foreign countries' security services. In addition, Norway is the subject of undesired intelligence activity carried out by several states. Foreign countries mainly engage their own intelligence and security services to protect their national interests.

Politically motivated violence – terrorism

Politically motivated violence in the form of extreme Islamist terrorism has a global dimension and could affect any country. The potential threat to Norway must therefore be seen in an international context. At least two large terrorist operations were averted in Europe in 2006, but there are individuals and groups in European countries who would like to carry out new attacks.

In 2007, PST will focus on two principal issues related to the terrorist threat:

(i) supporting terrorism and (ii) radicalization¹. Supporting terrorism is the main activity carried out by individuals with connections to extreme Islamist networks in Norway.

Supporting terrorism includes financing, and the forgery of identity documents. A large part of activities in support of terrorism contribute to foreign terrorist organizations that focus solely on the country concerned. Generally, such organizations do not present a direct threat to Norwegian targets.

The current terrorist threat in Europe arises first and foremost from individuals permanently residing in Europe who have been radicalized while living here. The vast majority of individuals in Norway connected to extreme Islamist activities were radicalized before they came to the country. There are currently no indications that radicalization of individuals resident in Norway is a significant element in the Norwegian threat picture, although the radicalization process can take place very quickly. Groups that are currently unknown or deemed to pose no significant threat, can within a short period acquire capacity that raises the level of threat they represent. In addition, individuals acting alone may also plan and carry out serious acts motivated by extreme Islamist ideology or terrorist propaganda, without the involvement of a group or network. These developments require PST and other Norwegian authorities to carry out general prevention work aimed at combating the radicalization of people by extreme Islamist ideology and preventing individuals who already subscribe to such an ideology from establishing independent operational groups in Norway.

Politically motivated violence – national extremism²

The national extremist scene in Norway includes players from both the extreme right and extreme left. None of these currently represent a real threat to vital national interests. The use of violence by these groups does however create an atmosphere of fear and insecurity, which could ultimately represent a threat to Norwegian society.

¹ *Radicalization* is used by PST to refer to the process by which a person increasingly accepts the use of violence as a means of achieving political ends. Radicalization may relate to any political direction and does not exclusively relate to Islamism.

² *Extreme* is used by PST to describe a person who supports, encourages and justifies the use of violence or who carries out acts of violence or sabotage as a political means. *Extreme* therefore denotes the method and means but not the attitude of an individual.

Over the past year there have been a number of instances of racially motivated violence, which can be attributed to individuals connected to the violent far right. However, the extremist groups, as such, appear to be unorganized and to have a reduced membership. Violent autonomous groups have been behind fewer violent incidents than before, and represent a lower level of threat than has been the case for many years. However, the war on terror and Islamist terrorist activity appears to have a polarizing effect on these groups and can in certain cases result in increased recruitment to and unity within the national extremist groups.

Counter illegal intelligence activity

The intelligence services of several states collect information relating to various matters in Norway in a manner that may contravene Norwegian and international law. The level of activity must be regarded as high. The extent of the activity and the areas of interest to the services change little from year to year.

Intelligence activity targets both public and private players involved in the political decision-making processes, and those who deal with issues that include Norwegian economic, resources and security policy. Intelligence services use a wide range of methods for the collection of information. In addition to the use of open sources, the methods mainly entail the use of personal contacts.

Foreign intelligence services' interest in Norwegian petroleum and gas industries presents a particular challenge to Norway. The High North generally, and energy, technological advances and natural resources issues particularly, are currently subject to a significant and increasing level of international attention. Unresolved issues regarding the situation in the High North involve an increase in the general intelligence threat to both private and public sector players in Norway.

The intelligence threat in Norway reflects to a large extent the situation in other allied countries in terms of which players are active, their level of activity and the targets of their activities. Representatives from Norwegian private and public organizations must therefore regard themselves as being an intelligence target even when they are abroad.

Threats to dignitaries

Norwegian dignitaries are exposed to threats and harassment of various kinds. Very few threats have been backed up by action, but the threat picture is unpredictable. Many threats are made anonymously, and it is often difficult to identify the real motive behind such threats. Many individuals who make threats also have a serious mental illness, which can make it difficult to predict their capacity and willingness to carry out the threats. Changes in the nature of their illness, interrupted courses of medication or drug/alcohol abuse could make the situation even more unpredictable.

Several members of the Government and members of Parliament receive various threats and offensive messages as a result of their involvement in politics. Dignitaries involved in political issues that are controversial and that entail the exchange of strong views, with wide media coverage, are particularly vulnerable to threats. The past year has seen threats and offensive messages related to politicians' involvement in areas such as tax and excise policy, transport policy and health and social policy. PST is observing with particular concern a group of players who make threats in connection with political or administrative decisions in individual cases. This is especially true of asylum and immigration policy; traumatized and mentally ill asylum seekers whose application is rejected and who await deportation could potentially represent a threat to dignitaries in Norway.

There are no indications that the general threat picture relating to Norwegian dignitaries will change significantly in the period ahead. There is, however, uncertainty around the threat picture relating to certain dignitaries, and new threats may arise without warning. In addition, preventive activity must take into account the fact that individuals who would like to attack dignitaries do not necessarily announce their intention before they act, so they may be unknown to both the police and PST.

Weapons of mass destruction

As is the case in other European countries, Norwegian businesses and research institutions are a target for countries that would like to obtain products, technology and expertise for use in the development of nuclear weapons. Attempts have been made to make secret purchases from Norwegian companies for the benefit of the arms program of foreign countries that have or may develop nuclear weapons.

Some non-state actors have expressed an interest in obtaining weapons of mass destruction. Non-state players are believed, however, to have little capacity to carry out mass murder operations through this means. The likelihood is that no non-state actors currently possess the necessary capacity to develop nuclear weapons. However, it is alarming that some states that have succeeded in developing nuclear weapons could potentially become a source of the spread of such capacity to non-state actors.

The operational and technical requirements for the effective use of chemical and biological weapons are difficult to satisfy. Non-state actors have however access to both the precursors and technology to produce simple biological and chemical substances. Nor can we rule out that non-state actors might use radioactive substances for terrorist purposes.